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Team role preference, as formulated by Meredith Belbin, and cognitive style are both rooted in personality. As a consequence, it should be possible to successfully hypothesise certain relationships between team role preferences and cognitive style, or one or more of its components. To test this idea, data was collected by administering the Kirton Adaption Innovation inventory and Cattell’s 16PF personality questionnaire to a group of undergraduate students (n = 183) who were reading a mixed engineering and business degree. This paper reports correlations which substantiate some of the postulated relationships. The findings, which suggest that the ideal Belbin team contains a balanced mix of adaptors, innovators and bridgers, give a new perspective to the Belbin team role model, and should provide some guidance to those who seek to build and operate “Belbinesque” teams.

Against the background of a recent investigation into the internal reliability and the validity of the Belbin Team Role Self‐perception Inventory, two linked studies were undertaken. In the first, test‐retest reliabilities of the Belbin self‐perception inventory were measured and found to be unsatisfactory; in the second, correlations with team roles forecast on the basis of 16PF data were attempted and, with the exception of one team role, no substantial correlations were established. Provides support for the use of 16PF as the preferred method for estimating team role preferences rather than the Belbin self‐perception inventory data.

Reports the results of an investigation into the effect of the childhood family environment on the management team roles (as defined by Belbin) adopted by 199 young adults. Moos′s Family Environment Scale and Cattell′s 16PF were used to obtain measures of family environment and management team roles, respectively and significant correlations of the anticipated magnitude were obtained which showed how behaviours learned in the early home may be carried over into management team behaviour.

States that organizations are using teams and groups to an increasing extent yet current researchers often use the terms interchangeably, despite literature indicating both that their processes and outputs may be very different, and that these differences may have important consequences. Examines how, in order to differentiate between management teams and groups based on the descriptions of managers’ experience in the workplace, 319 part‐time MBA students completed a checklist comprising 149 adjectives. Analyses showed that both teams and groups were best described by separate one factor solutions. Discusses how teams and groups were described equally as “affective”, “effective”, “energetic” and “flexible”; teams were described as “creative”, “innovative”, and “well rounded”, groups were described as “negotiating”, “networking”, “persuasive”, and “the sum of individual goals”. Posits that such characterizations were taken as suggesting that teams create resources and add to their environments while groups manage and redistribute their resources, and further, that teams have stable, valued interpersonal relations but groups do not.

The past two decades of economic activity in the U.S. have been characterized by both high inflation and interest rates in comparison to previous periods of stability. The importance of these two variables to our economic welfare and to the effectiveness of economic policy have led to renewed interest in the Fisher Effect. This is the hypothesis put forth by Irving Fisher describing the relationship between these two variables. It usually takes the form R = re + pe + repe (1) in which R is the nominal rate of interest, re is the expected real rate of interest, and pe is the expected rate of change of prices. The term repe is usually considered insignificant and is dropped, giving R = re + pe. (2) Although this equation can be readily quantified on an ex post basis using actual rather than expected values, the fact that expectation of r and p are not directly observable have always made it difficult to derive an ex ante measure of the real rate.

This research provides accounting-ethics authors and administrators with a benchmark for accounting-ethics research. While Bernardi and Bean (2010) considered publications in business-ethics and accounting’s top-40 journals this study considers research in eight accounting-ethics and public-interest journals, as well as, 34 business-ethics journals. We analyzed the contents of our 42 journals for the 25-year period between 1991 through 2015. This research documents the continued growth (Bernardi & Bean, 2007) of accounting-ethics research in both accounting-ethics and business-ethics journals. We provide data on the top-10 ethics authors in each doctoral year group, the top-50 ethics authors over the most recent 10, 20, and 25 years, and a distribution among ethics scholars for these periods. For the 25-year timeframe, our data indicate that only 665 (274) of the 5,125 accounting PhDs/DBAs (13.0% and 5.4% respectively) in Canada and the United States had authored or co-authored one (more than one) ethics article.

This chapter investigates the nature of the transformation of macroeconomics by focusing on the impact of the Great Depression on economic doctrines. There is no doubt that the Great Depression exerted an enormous influence on economic thought, but the exact nature of its impact should be examined more carefully. In this chapter, I examine the transformation from a perspective which emphasizes the interaction between economic ideas and economic events, and the interaction between theory and policy rather than the development of economic theory. More specifically, I examine the evolution of what became known as macroeconomics after the Depression in terms of an ongoing debate among the “stabilizers” and their critics. I further suggest using four perspectives, or schools of thought, as measures to locate the evolution and transformation; the gold standard mentality, liquidationism, the Treasury view, and the real-bills doctrine. By highlighting these four economic ideas, I argue that what happened during the Great Depression was the retreat of the gold standard mentality, the complete demise of liquidationism and the Treasury view, and the strange survival of the real-bills doctrine. Each of those transformations happened not in response to internal debates in the discipline, but in response to government policies and real-world events.

This chapter examines the manner in which a disaster-affected population of artisanal fishers relocated inland to new sites following the Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004 experienced and adapted to problems of water quality, scarcity, sanitation, and drainage. While numerous studies of conflicts over water tend to focus on issues of equitable access (see Anand, 2011), this chapter seeks to link the problem to the contested priorities driving land and resource use and access. I show how inland relocation negatively impacted households, making it harder to sustain livelihoods due to distance from the coast, while imposing new costs including that of commodified and scarce water, locational deficiencies, and the structural weaknesses of new housing. Placed in a historical context, the problem of water can be seen as an aspect of the long-term problem of ecologically unequal exchange pitting local artisanal fisher communities against an aggressively state-supported commercial fishery sector. The continuity I seek to hone in on is the pattern of imposing costs on fishers while enabling the alienation and privatization of coastal resources. Taking water not only as a vital substance presenting questions of access and quality but also as a problem of drainage and effluence enables a fuller consideration of how the unequal distribution of costs on poorer populations became legitimized in the name of recovery. At the same time, the chapter also highlights the manner in which fishers refused to remain docile subjects of power and used their agency and autonomy in adapting to and sometimes refusing the terms of relocation.